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Ford: Insurance--Vacancy Clause--Effect of Uninhabitability Due to Fire
RECENT CASE COMMENTS

is no other distributee to take. That should satisfy the escheat
statute. The present statute, in effect, renders the murderer not
a distributee.
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EFFECT

OF

UINHABIT-

FreE. - A, the insurer, gave notice to M,
the insured, to protect his partially burned house from further
damage by fire. Pending the exercise of the option to repair or
pay the loss, a second fire destroyed that part of the house not
previously burned. This occurred after the forty day vacancy
clause had expired. A denied liability for the second fire, but thc
case was submitted to the jury on the theory that notwithstanding
the vacancy of the building, the jury might consider the damages
caused by the second fire and whether or not, under the facts of
this case, A had not waived the provisions of the policy as to
occupancy. Held: The decision for M was based on the ground
that the vacancy clause was not intended to cover an unoccupiable
house. American Central Ins. Co. v. McHose.
There seems to be a paucity of authority. All three of the
known cases, in point, were cited in the opinion. In support of
the principal case, are two Nebraska decisions' based on occupancy
of a dwelling uninhabited because of partial destruction by fire,
could not have been within the contemplation of the parties. The
opposing view is represented by a New Jersey case grounded on
the fact that the insured agreed to ask the company for a permit
in case he desired to vacate the insured property for any cause
longer than the time permitted by the vacancy clause in the policy.
The dissenting opinion, in the principal case effectually disposes of the waiver argument by reference to the federal rule
excluding oral evidence of waiver of written stipulations.' But
it fails to give full weight to another provision of the policy
which was operative in this case, the option of the insurance company to pay the loss or rebuild the property. The result may be
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*66 F. (2d) 749 (C. C. A. 3d, 1933).
2
Schmidt v. Williamsburgh City Fire Ins. Co., 98 Neb. 61, 151 X. W. 920
(1915); Lancashire Ins. Co. v. Bush, 60 Neb. 116, 82 N. W. 313 (1900).
3 Kupfersmith v. Delaware Ins. Co., 84 N. J. L. 271, 86 AtI. 399, 45 L.

R. A. (N. S.) 847 (1913).
'American Cenfral Ins. Co. v. McHose, supra n. 1, at 752.
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sustained, on a narrow ground, by reading this option clause as
in pari materia with the vacancy clause, and thereby limiting the
latter. The insured could not repair the building without trenching on the right of the insurer until its option was exercised. The
vacancy clause would thus not be operative before action on the
option clause. Since the insurer had notice of the first fire, and
perhaps did not wish to continue the insurance he could, when
the forty day period expired, have canceled the policy. Not having done so, the policy should remain in effect.'
The court, however, goes on a broader ground: namely, that
the parties contracted on the basis of the house being inhabitable.
This reasoning would apply, no matter for what reason the house
was vacated, if it, in fact, were uninhabitable." This probably
exceeds the bounds of construction but the burden of risk is not
a reasonable one. It should be noticed that such a rule increases
the burden on the court and defense counsel since inhabitability
is a variable matter of proof.
-FpxDERICK W. FORD.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE -

2MUST

PLAINTIFF PLEAD ADEQUACY

oF CONsmERATION? - The plaintiff, C, instituted an action against
W, administrator of the estate of S, for the specific performance
of an oral agreement between C and S, whereby the latter
promised to devise property to the former if the plaintiff would
come and live with her and assist her in domestic affairs and bring
J, the plaintiff's husband, to assist her in her business affairs.
C performed in full but S died without having made the proposed
will. The petition alleged in detail extensive services claimed to
be as valuable as the property decedent had agreed to devise
petitioner. Held: The failure to allege the value of the services
rendered by the plaintiff to the deceased, or the value of the land
f the company did not have notice of the damage it is suggested that
they should be given a reasonable length of time to cancel the policy. Where
the second fire destroys the house after the vacancy clause expires, but before notice, probably the insured should bear the loss.
0 Gash v. Home Ins. Co. of N. Y., 153 Ill. App. 31 (1910). In this case,
a flood damaged the property and the day before the insured moved back
to the house, which was after the vacancy clause elapsed, the house was
destroyed by fire. The insured recovered even though there had been no
notice of the vacancy.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol40/iss2/13

2

